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While recommending either or all those volumes, we do not
suppose the American student is to pursue the study of the
Roman law into its specialities and details. It would be difficult
to persuade him to do this, even if he had time. Most of our
students, moreover, have not time for this, if they had inclination. But if one of these wishes to go beyond the scope of
the mechanical details of his profession, and to ascend into the
purer and clearer atmosphere of jurisprudence as a liberal science,
he cannot do it more readily or effectually than by drawing inspiration from that immortal system of which it has been eloquently said: "As if the mighty destinies of Rome were not
fulfilled, she reigns throughout the whole earth by her reason,
after having ceased to reign by her authority."
EMORY WASHBURN.
Cambridge.
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Assertion of title by the possessor of land is an important circumstance indicat,
ing adverse possession and ouster of the real owner, and the absence of such as.
sertion may be an important circumstance indicating that the possession is not
adverse. But the question of ouster must depend upon all the circumstances of the
case, and it is not essential that the possessor should hold the land claiming it as
his own. Such claim of ownership is not, as matter of law, an indispensable element of adverse possession.
In trespass qu. cl., the declaration alleged that the defendant broke and entered
into the plaintiff's land, and trod down and destroyed the herbage, and cut down
the trees, and dug up the ground, to the plaintiff's damage. The plaintiff introduced evidence to prove that the defendant not only cut down the trees, but removed
the wood ; and the court charged the jury, that in estimating damages they
might take into consideration the cutting and removal of the wood, if the trespas,
was one continued act. Held, that the evidence was inadmissible, and the charg.
erroneous.

qu. cl. fregit; appealed from the judgment of a
justice of the peace to the Superior Court, and tried on the
general issue closed to the jury, with notice of title in the defendant by adverse possession. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, and the defendant moved for a new trial for error in the
rulings and charge of the court.
TRESPASS
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The points assigned as error sufficiently appear in the opinion
of the court.
.lves and Alling for the motion.
Doolittle, contra.
J.-This is an action of trespass quare elausum, in
which the plaintiff avers that the defendant with force and arms
broke and entered into and upon the plaintiff's land, and trod
down and destroyed the herbage then and there growing, and cut
down the trees, and dug up the ground, to the plaintiff's damage.
Under this declaration the plaintiff was permitted, against the
defendant's objection, to prove that the defendant not only cut
down the trees, but removed the wood, and the jury were instructed
that in estimating damages they might take into consideration the
cutting and removal of the wood, if the trespass was one continued
act. It is conceded that the cutting the trees and carrying away
the wood may be parts of one continued act, and if they are so,
the plaintiff may so treat them, and recover for the entire act
in one count, provided the count be with proper averments
adapted to the case. The cutting, however, may be wholly unconnected with the carrying away of the trees cut, and then, by
strict rule, there should be two counts for the two acts, one for
the cutting, and another for the carrying away. But where the
plaintiff claims damages in his declaration for the cutting only,
the defendant cannot be required to come to trial prepared to
meet evidence of damage done by removal. The office of the
declaration is to apprise the defendant fairly and fully of the
plaintiff's claims; and the cutting of the trees does not involve
their removal. The mere cutting may be a slight injury to the
owner, and sometimes might be a benefit. The carrying them
away and converting them to the defendant's use, is quite a distinct thing.
For this cause there must be a new trial.
The charge of the judge in regard to adverse possession was
probably correct in reference to the circumstances of the case
before him, but abstractly considered is liable to objection, and
would be quite incorrect in reference to cases that have occurred,
and may again occur. The charge is as follows: "A person to
acquire a title by possession, must have the actual use and possesSEYMOUR,
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mon ol the land. It is essential that the possession should be
adverse to the right of the owner, and that the possessor should
hold the land claiming it as his own, and denying the right of
everybody else."
In the case of Huntington v. Whaley, 29 Conn. 398, Judge
SANFORD, giving the opinion of the court, says: "The only legitimate inquiry for the jury was, whether the defendant, and those
under whom he claimed, had for the period of fifteen years had
the actual, open, adverse occupancy and possession of the controverted property, claiming it as their own, and actually excluding
all other persons from the possession." As applied to the facts
in the case of Huntington v. Whaley this language is not open to
objection; but as an absolute proposition of law, and as a complete definition of adverse possession applicable to all cases, the
charge of the judge below, and the language quoted from Judge
SANFORD'S opinion in Huntington v. Whaley, require explanation
and qualification.
In the case of French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 442, Judge HOSMER,
in speaking approvingly of the case of Bryan v. Atwater, 5 Day
181, says; "the first principle asserted in that case is, that to
render a possession adverse it is not necessary that it should be
accompanied with a claim of title, and with the denial of the opposing title." Now although the language of Judge SANFORD, in
Huntington v. Whaley, is in direct contradiction to the language of
Judge HosmER, in Frenchv. Pearce, it was not Judge SANFORD'S
intention to question the soundness of Judge HOSMER'S views.
Judge SANFORD did not undertake to give a complete definition
of adverse possession as applicable to all cases; he intended
merely to say that, situated as the defendant was in the case of
Huntingdon v. Whaley, the legitimate inquiry for the jury was
whether the defendant had possession of the controverted property,
claiming it as his own. From what appears of the facts in the
case now under our consideration, the absence of a claim of ownership on the part of the defendant would appear to be a 7ery
decisive circumstance to show that the possession was not adverse,
but it is clear that such claim of ownership is not, as matter of
law, an indispensable element of adverse possession. A party in
possession of land under a defective deed may openly admit that
the legal title remains in the grantor, and admit that his own
ownership is therefore imperfect, and yet his possession may be
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adverse. The right of the owner of real estate is barred, if ne
suffer himself to be ousted of possession for fifteen years, and the
true inquiry in these cases is whether the owner is ousted.
Judge INGERSOLL, in Bryan v. Atwater, places the subject in its
true light, when he says: "To make a disseisin it is not necessary
that the disseisor should claim title to the lands taken by him. It
is not necessary that he should disclaim or deny the title of
the legal proprietor. It is necessary only that he should enter
into and take possession of the lands as if they were his own.
*
*
* If property be so taken and so used by any one.
though he claims no title, but avers himself to be a wrongdoer,
yet by such act the legal proprietor is disseised."
The result of the cases is, that assertion of title by the possessor
is an important circumstance indicating adverse possession and
ouster of the real owner, and the absence of such assertion may
be an important circumstance, and often very important, as indicating that the possession is not adverse; yet the question of ouster
is one that must depend upon all the circumstances of the case, and
it is not therefore strictly true, as stated in the charge under consideration, that it is essential that the possessor should hold the
land claiming it as his own, and denying the right of everybody else.
In the instance given above of the occupant under a defective
deed, there is indeed a sense in which le may be said to claim the
land as his own. He may properly assert his equitable title, as
being superior to the legal title which he admits to be in his
grantor. But whether he asserts such claim or not makes no
difference with his rights. The mere fact of possession under a
defective deed would, in general, indicate that the possession was
adverse. In the case put by Judge INGERSOLL in Bryan v.
Atwater, where the party in possession avows himself to be a
wrongdoer, the true owner would be disseised, and the possession would be adverse, and in such a case there is clearly no
claim of title by the possessor in any sense of the term.
New trial advised.
In this opinion the other judges concurred; except
0. J., who did not sit.

BUTLER,

The propnsition maintained in the claim of title in the disseisor, is no doubt
foregoing opinion, in regard to adverse
possession not necessarily implying a

abstractly sound, and, as explained by
the learned judge, is not calculated to
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mislead or give any false impression. ated a species of nominal disseishs, or disBut practically it is of a misleading seisin at the election of the owner, which
character, as it seems to us, tending to has not much obtained in the New Engthe impression that one in the possession land States-certainly not in Connectiand use of land, for the term of the cut and Vermont-and of which we now
statute of limitations in regard to rights hear very little in the American cases.
Our cases go mainly upon an actual
of entry, may acquire title, while all the
time acknowledging the title of the for- ouster or disseisin and a continued ad'ner possessor ; which is not true, as a verse possession for the term of the statgeneral rule, but the contrary. We do ute of limitations, which begins to run
not expect as a general thing that men from the disseisin.
The prescription of the civil law was
will go about the country dispossessing
others of their lands in mere wanton- based upon an adverse possession, which
ness and with no claim of right on their must be neque clam, neque precario, neque
part. This may occur in some portions vi. But these requirements have not in
of the country, where the only efficient all respects been so strictly applied in
government is that of a vigilance commit- American courts as would seem to be
tee, and the population is largely made required by some of the civil law writup of what are technically denominated ers. For it really makes no essential
roughs. And where such cases occur, difference here that the party claiming
no doubt, the transaction would well de- title by adverse possession obtained such
serve the name of a disseisin, and the possession by force and violence. If it
possession become sufficiently adverse. were so obtained as to give the former
But this can scarcely be regarded as a possessor a right of action, and has been
normal state of things, or one to be pro- so long maintained as to bar that right
vided for by the administrators of the of action, the title of the former occupier
law. Text writers and judges more is none the less lost even if he were the
commonly prepare their definitions with real owner. But the cases all assume
reference to the ordinary mode of trans- that the party thus claiming title must
acting similar affairs in civilized life. have entered and possessed the land,
Hence Mr. Angell defines adverse pos- claiming to be the owner in fee, or at
session in these words : "1It is the oc- least by some title independent of the
cupation with an intent to claim against person upon whom he made his entry.
390, Angell on Lim- TnobPsoN, Justice, in Jackson v. Porthe true owner."
itations. Under the feudal tenures there ter, 1 Paine C.0. 457, says: "It is not
seems to have been great uncertainty as possession alone, but that it is accomto what constituted a disseisin of the panied with the claim of the fee, which
tenant: Taylor dem. Atkyns v. Horde, by construction of law is deemed priaud
I Barr. 60. Lord MANSFIELD, 0. J., facie evidence of such an estate." And
here says : "Disseisin must mean some the learned author of the Treatise on
way or other turning the tenant out of his Limitations, already referred to, in sumtenure and usurping his place and feudal ming up the cases, adds, "Indeed that it
The remedy by assize of is the intentionto claim title which makes
relation."
novel disseisin was invented in order to the possession of the holder of the land
afford a clear and more perfect remedy adverse, is the doctrine upon which the
to the party disseised, which, as Lord decision in every case proceeds. If it be
MANSFIELD here says, "was extended clear that there is no such intention, there
to almost every case of obstruction to an can be no pretense of an adverse possesowner's full enjoyment of lands, tene- sion." But we can conceive that one
ments and hercditiments." This cre- may enter into possession of land, which
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he knows belongs to another, with the
express ptxpose of acquiring title by adererse possession, and that he may all the
Lime during the period requisite to acquire title by adverse possession, be
ready to admit that the title to the land
is not in him, but in another, and that
he is maintaining an adverse possession
with the view of acquiring the title. In
such a case we are not prepared to say
the possession is not adverse, and that it
will not transfer the title after the proper
period has elapsed. But it scarcely comes
within the definition of the civil law, neque precario.
And when one contracts for the purchase of land and pays the whole price,
and enters into the possession without a
conveyance, his possession will be adverse to that of the former owner, and
the title be transferred to him after the
lapse of the period of the statute of limitations, although he may during all the
time be ready to admit that the title is
still in his vendor. Brown v. King, 5 Met.
(Mass.) 173; Ellison v. Cathcart, 1
McMallan (S. C.) 5. But, upon general principles, neither a vendee or quasi
trustee of any kind can set up an adverse
claim of title to the land, so long as he
recognises the contract by which he entered into possession. Brown v. King,
%upra; WIoods v. Dille, 11 Ohio 455.
But some of the cases deny that one can
acquire title to land by possession under
a rontract for purchase, even when it is
lles v. Day, 4 Conn.
tully performed.
95. But the reason and principle seem
ti favor of the Massachusetts rule in this
respect.

337, that where one enters into posses
sion of land under a parol gift, the possession will be held adverse and title will
be acquired under the statute. Ch. J.
SIsAw here says, that although a grant,
gift or sale of land by parol, is void under the statute of frauds, yet when accompanied by an actual entry into possession, it manifests the intent of the donee to enter in his own right, and not
as tenant, and there is an implied admission on the part of the donor that the
entry is so made. And the same rule
would apply if the entry were made by
the grantee under a deed defectively executed, so as not to pass the title ; the
possession would confirm the title.
We conclude, therefore, that although
it is possible to have an adverse possession of land, by a party acting in good
faith and not with any view to obtain the
land unjustly, short of claiming to be
the owner of the land at the time of the
entry, there must always exist a continued claim to hold the possession
against the right, title or claim of the
former owner or possessor ; indeed to
constitute an adverse possession which
will ripen into title in the possessor, it
must be accompanied with a claim either
express or implied, to hold the possession against all the world, and in the
right of the party thus in possession.
We admit that, abstractly speaking, it
may be the right of superior force, ultima ratio regum; but the possession, in
order to be of such an adverse character
as to ripen into title under the statute of
limitations, must be under a claim of

And it seems v°ery justly to right of some kind in the possessor, at

have been held in a later case in Mas- least to maintain the possession against
I. F. R.
aacnsctt, Sumner v. tevens, 6 Met. all others.
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supreme Court of 1lhinoi8.
PEORIA AND ROCK ISLAND R. R. CO. v.THE COAL VALLEY
MINING CO.
A contract between two common carriers, having connecting lines and running
privileges over each other's routes, by which a certain kind of business is to be
performed solely by one of them, will not be enforced in equity by injunction, or
in any manner which will prevent either carrier from performing its duties to the
public.
A railroad company and a coal company, both being carriers of freight, with
connecting lines, made an agreement that the coal company should carry all the
coal between two certain points, and perform all the public duties incumbent on
the railroad company, in reference to the carriage of coal; and that if any coal
should be carried by the railroad company, the latter should pay the coal company fifty cents per ton for such carriage, and the right of the railroad company
to use certain parts of the road and bridges of the coal company should cease and
be suspended while such payments should be in arrear. Held, that whether such
agreement was binding or not on the parties, a court of equity would not enforce
it by injunction, so as to interfere with the public right to demand carriage of coal
by either party.
APPEAL

from Whiteside.

Ingersoll and McoCutne, for appellants.
Charles H. Osborne, for appellee.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WALKER, J.-This was a bill in chancery filed by appellee in
the Rock Island Circuit Court against appellants, to compel them
to perform a contract and to enjoin a breach of the same. The
bill alleges that the Coal Valley Mining Company was incorporated
in 1856, for the purpose of mining and transporting coal from
Coal Valley to Rock Island and other points. Its powers were
increased by the General Assembly in 1865, and it was then authorized to acquire title to so much of Rock Island and Peoria
Railroad as was then completed, extending from Rock Island to
Coal Valley.
It is further alleged that the Rock Island and Peoria Railroad
Company was incorporated in 1855, with power to construct a
railroad from Rock Island to Peoria, and did construct a railroad
from Rock Island to Coal Valley, and issued one hundred and
fifty bonds for one thousand dollars each, and mortgaged the road,
its property and franchises, to secure the payment of the same.
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It is further charged that appellee acquired title to the Rock
Island and Peoria Railroad Company, subject to the mortgage on
the road given to secure the $150,000 of bonds it had issued prior
to 1869. Appellees purchased these bonds and a large amount
of floating indebtedness, and nearly all of the stock of the road, all
of which was in the hands of P. L. Cable. But before this was
all accomplished, the Peoria and Rock Island Railroad Company
had been incorporated and authorized to construct a railroad from
Peoria to Rock Island.
That on September 4th 1869, a contract was entered into
by appellee with the Rock Island and Peoria Railroad Company.
That agreement, among other provisions, contained this:
"And the said party of the first part, for itself, successors and
assigns, hereby agrees to pay said party of the second part the
sum of ten thousand five hundred dollars per annum, as interest
on the sum due said party of the second part, on account of the
surrender of said stock and said coupons, and the release of its
said claims, which sum shall only be payable in track service,
for th. transportation of coal over the said road in Rock Island
county, at the rate of one cent and a quarter per ton per mile,
always computing the distance as twelve miles, thus making the
rate fifteen cents per ton for the use of the track, whether transported that distance or not; and in consideration that the said
party of the second part agrees to accept the right to transport
seventy thousand tons of coal during each and every year over
the road as aforesaid, with its own motive power and rolling-stock,
in full satisfaction of said sum of ten thousand five hundred
dollars, whether it transports that amount or not, and on or
before the 10th day of January of each year, to pay said party
of the first part for any excess it may transport over said seventy
thousand tons, in or during the year then next preceding, at the
rate of fifteen cents per ton ; it is hereby agreed that said party
of the first part, its successors and assigns, shall pay said party
of the second part, fifty cents per ton on all the coal transported
by any party, except said party of the second part, over said railroad to the north side of Rock river, or over the bridges, which
said party of the first part may use in crossing said river, which
fifty cents per ton the said party of the second part shall be
entitled to, to make up any deficit which may have occurred, or
may thereafter occur in the seventy thousand tons aforesaid.
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"Payment for all the coal so transported during each month
shall be made by said party of the first part, its successors or
assigns, to said party of the second part, within ten days of the
expiration of said month, and if said party of the first part, its
successors or assigns, shall fail to pay the same within the above
limited time, the right of any and all parties, except said party
of the second part, to transport coal ovef said road to the noith
side of Rock river, or over said bridges, shall cease and become
exclusive in said party of the second part, and so remain until
said payment is made-it being the object and intention of this
contract to give no party, except saidparty of the second part,any
right to transport coal over said road to the north side of Rock
river, or over said bridges, only when there is nothing due nnder
thig provision to said party of the second part. And the said
party of the second part agrees to perform all the duties which
said party of the first part, its successors or assigns, may owe to
the public, so far as the transportation of coal is concerned,
between Coal Valley and Rock Island and all intervening points,
charging such rates therefor as it reasonably and lawfully may,
and all coal which said party of the first part, its successors or
assigns, may bring to Coal Valley, designed for Rock Island and
intervening points, the said party of the second part will, at all
times, promptly transport at such rates as it may reasonably and
lawfully charge therefor."
The bill further alleges that subsequently the Rock Island and
Peoria Railroad Company consolidated with the Peoria and Rock
Island Railway Compaiy, and the consolidated company became
and is the company made defendant to the bill, and it assumed
the contract of September 4th, 1869, between appellee and the
Rock Island and Peoria Railroad Company, and entered into a
contract binding itself thereto. That appellant has been and is
engaged in carrying coal over their road, and refused to pay
fifty cents per ton as agreed. The bill charges that appellants
are insolvent.
It is also alleged that the Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis
Railroad Company had entered into a contract with appellee in all
material respects similar to that made with the Peoria and Rock
Island Railroad Company, who were using the track, switches,
side-tracks and lateral lines of appellee at Coal Valley, and that
company is made a party to the bill.
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The bill prays that appellant be compelled to keep and perform their contract, and be restrained from using the side-tracks,
switches and lateral lines at Coal Valley, and to enjoin appellants
and their officers from transporting any coal over the road to the
north side of Rock river, or over the bridges which the companies use in crossing the river, until appellants shall account and
pay fifty cents a ton foik all coal they had transported by each of
the roads, and from transporting coal as aforesaid unless they
shall account for the same at the time stipulated. Also to
require the company to account for and pay appellee, who
claims the ownership of the switches, side-tracks and lateral
lines, a reasonable sum for the use of the same.
Before the hearing on the demurrer the venue was changed to
the Circuit Court of Whiteside county.
To this bill appellant filed a demurrer, and assigned as grounds
that the Peoria and Rock Island Railroad Company had no
power to make such a contract, and that it is void. That the
company had no right or power to bind themselves for the payment of fifty cents a ton on coal transported over the road, as
such contract is against public policy and is void. On the hearing on the demurrer, in the court below, it was overruled, and a
decree was rendered making the temporary injunction perpetual,
and the case is brought to this court by appeal.
The question presented is whether a Court of Chancery will
restrain these companies from carrying coal as freight for individuals, because appellants have agreed to pay appellee fifty
cents for each ton so carried, and because appellants refuse to
pay, at that rate. Is such a contract ultra vires and against
public policy? We think not. The act of the general assembly
under which these considerations and contracts were made is
quite broad and comprehensive. It is apparent, from their charters, that the Coal Valley Mining Company, when it purchased
the Rock Island Railroad, became and was a public railroad company entitled to the rights, privileges and powers conferred by its
charter. It is conceded that the mining company was before
the consolidation a carrier of passengers and freights between
Rock Island and Coal Valley, and both companies reserved that
right when the consolidation was formed, and they had been and
ivere still exercising these rights. We have no doubt that each
of these companies had ample power, under the general law of the

P. & R. I. RAILROAD CO. v. MINING CO.

state authorizing railroad companies to make running arrangements with each other, and to consolidate their roads on such
terms as they may agree. And so far is we see, these companies
did make a valid and binding consolidation.
But conceding this all to be true, will a court of equity afford
relief in the mode sought in this case ? In other words, have not
the public such an interest in the use and continued operation of
the railroads of the state, as should forbid the court from enjoining the freights and property of individuals from being transported
because the company has entered into an engagement to pay a
stipulated sum for track-service or toll for the right to run over
another road and carry passengers and freights, and should not the
chancellor leave the parties to seek their remedy by an action at
law on the contract ?
When these great and useful bodies were created there were
two considerations that induced their organization. One was, and
it was the highest and most important, the accommodation of the
public and the promotion of their interests. The other was the
promotion of the interest of the individual stockholders in such
companies. The primary object of the people of the state ever
has been, in creating railroads, to afford facilities for trade and
commerce by speedy, convenient and cheap travel and transporta.
tion of merchandise, the products and the minerals of the country
to the best markets, thus supplying every section with the products of other sections. They were needed and adapted to ready
and rapid exchange of commodities, and the rapid development of
the resources of the country, and have from an early period
after their introduction been known and regarded as the greatest
of all the means employed by our civilization in advancing the
trade and commerce of our country. And they have fulfilled the
anticipations of the people in this regard.
It was such considerations as these, at an early day in the history of our state, that induced our people to enter upon a grand
but disastrous system of internal improvements. By it an effort
was made, at the expense of the state, to construct railroads
traversing its entire limits in every direction, and passing through
almost every county in its borders. In the effort many millions
was expended; the system failed, entailing a debt that almost
bankrupted the people, and entailed on them a depressing burden that they have not yet wholly extinguished.
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And it was the same considerations that have induced almost
every county, city, town, village and a great number of townships,
to incur debts which in the aggregate amount to a vast sum, to
subscribe for stock in railroads or make donations to such bodies;
and on which these corporations are paying an immense sum in
taxes to discharge the interest on these debts. And for all of
this vast sum thus contributed it is believed that cities, counties,
towns, villages and townships have nothing of value to show,
unless it be in rare instances. No one can believe that the people have expended these vast sums, burthened themselves, in
many instances, to the point of ruin, and entailed upon themselves and posterity debts and burthens that must be onerous, if
not destructive, for the benefit of private stockholders of these
companies. No one can entertain such an opinion. All must
comprehend the fact, that it was done mainly to promote the
public good and to advance our material interests.
Can any one suppose that it was merely to enrich and aggrandize the stockholders and the officers of these companies, that the
people, through their representatives in the general assembly, have
granted such liberal charters, authorizing them to use the highest
prerogative of sovereignty, eminent domain, to deprive the citizen
of his property for the use and benefit of these bodies; thus
relieving them of the necessity of being compelled to purchase
and pay exhorbitant prices for their right of way, depot, grounds
and material for the construction of these roads? On the contrary, all knew that such liberality and the grant of such powers
were conferred to advance public interest as the first and great
object.
But to accomplish this great purpose it was found necessary to
enlist private enterprise and capital. And to call it forth for the
acomplishment of the end, rights, privileges and immunities had
to be conferred and secured to those who would embark in the
construction and operation of these roads. Hence in their charters the rights and duties of the companies are either expressed
or implied. When created bodies corporate they become invested
with the right to construct and use their roads, to transport
both persons and property over their lines, and to receive compensation for the same. And when these bodies accept their
charters it is with the implied understanding that they will fairly
perform the duties of public common carriers of both persons and
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property. And at the same time a correlative duty is imposed,
that they shall receive and carry persons and freight on their
lines. And this is a duty they cannot escape by refusal, by contract or agreement with other persons or companies, that they
will disregard and refuse to perform them. These are duties
they owe the public, and it was in consideration that they would
be performed that their charters were granted. They then have
no power to disable themselves from performing these charter
obligations, and any effort to do so by contract is void. We are
not prepared to hold that the legislature could exonerate such
bodies from the performance of their duties.
Whilst railroads must be protected in all of their rights with
the same exactness that individuals are, they must at the same
time be held to a rigid performance of all their duties to the
public. Nor will they be permitted by contract or otherwise to
avoid their performance.
The roads who are litigating in this case, as common carriers,
owe the duty of transporting passengers and property for any
and all persons who require the performance of the service.
And coal is a kind of property suitable and proper to be carried over their several roads, and they must carry it as they do
any other freight, for all persons who bring it to their roads for
the purpose, on the same terms as they do other like freights,
similar in bulk and weight; and it is their duty to provide, as
common carriers, all reasonable facilities for its transporation.
Nor can these companies, by contract with each other, prevent
themselves from performing the duty imposed by their respective
charters. If they have so bound themselves, the contract is ultra
vires, so far as the public are concerned. Whether such a contract may be held valid and binding, as between themselves, when
suit at law shall be brought to recover the price agreed to be paid,
is not now before the court, and we refrain from its decision until
it shall be properly presented.
It is earnestly urged that the law empowering railroad com
panies to consolidate their lines and to make leases and running
arrangements, authorizes them to do so on such terms as they may
agree. And that the power being general this contract does not
contravene its provisions. The power is no doubt general to the
extent that they are capable of ontracting. But it must be
understood that it is with that limitation that it is general. The
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general assembly never could have intended to confer p)wer
upon these bodies, by contract with each other in consolidating
their roads and franchises, to absolve themselves from any duty
they were under as common carriers, simply by binding each other
not to observe such requirements. And that is what this contract does. Hence a court of equity has no power to enjoin
these companies from performing this duty to the public. The
decree of the court below must be reversed.
Decree reversed.
We cannot but admire the vein of oldfashioned honesty which seems to characterize the dealings of the Illinois Supreme Court with many of the quest;ons
affecting public duty. They do not seem
yet to have imbibed much of that modern
sentiment, that public duty is a kind of
anomaly in morals, much in the nature
of a contract or obligation which one enters into towards himself, as, for instance, to cultivate habits of decency
and cleanliness, or to lay in a proper
supply of food for the northern winter, or
to feed his cattle with regularity and
with proper liberality. Almost every
man considers himself so important a
part of the public that lie feels at liberty
to dispense with the performance of public duties, as if they were owing to himself exclusively, much upon the same
ground, probably, that each partner is
clothed with authority to release partnership debts, and to dispose of the common
property.
We cannot fairly regard this as evidence, perhaps, of any voluntary debasement of moral principle, whereby the
official becomes incapable of forming
correct judgments upon moral relations.
For we are not aware that any one
charges upon our public men any such
general demoralization as would render
them unreliable in the discharge of priinte trusts. Probably our public men
are as scrupulous and conscientious in
the di.scharge of private trusts as any
other class of men. And the same may

be true in a less degree in regard to public duties, which involve no question of
personal and private emolument. But
the moment this last element enters into
the estimate, the best public men we
have seem to lose head, and jump at
once to the conclusion that it is perfectly lawful and conscientious to grasp
all within their reach. We have had some
painful illustrations of this predominant
infirmity in public officers in the very
highest places, not so long since, as to
tax the memory so painfvlly in remembering them, as in our desire to forget
them. And there is too much reason to
fear that the disease has become too general to admit of speedy cure.
We have thus said far more than we
intended, in order to show the difficulty
of enforcing public duties against the
general public sentiment of the country.
Railways naturally expect the same
liberty to put off public duties which
other public servants allow themselves.
We are tempted to ask the profession
and the public, how long they can fairly
expect the courts to stand up against this
desolating tide of moral debasement ?
If it can be done long, without some revulsion and reformation among the
masses of our people, it will be more
than the lessons of history allow us fairly to expect. And it seems to us the
people of Illinois have great reason to
felicitate themselves in being able to
sustain their judiciary at so high a point

of integrity and firmness in dealing wi&
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so many of these exciting questions of
public interest and public duty, and especially in regard to railway transportartion. These cases are already considerably numerous in that court, and
all ruled in favor of public duty. It is
obvious these questions will, sooner or
later, have to be met by the courts in
every part of the country, and we fear
altogether by the state courts, since
there is little hope of any remedy at the
hands of Congress in the way of regulating interstate commerce. The railways have too great influence in the
congressional districts, and in the lobby,
to make anysuch reform hopeful against
the wishes of the companies. And the
companies, as it seems to us, are standing too much in their own light and that
of their true interests, in offering such
formidable and combined opposition to
all reasonable and just provisions enforcing their general public duties as
carriers. There seems to be a general
feeling among railway men, that it will
not do to trust anything either to the legislatures or the courts, and especially
the former. And this feeling seems to
he encouraged and kept up by the class of
idle and worthless men who spend their
lives in legislative lobbies, in attempting to serve their employers by corrupting better men than either ; when
the proper degree of confidence and fair
dealing, on the part of the railways,
would enable them to obtain far better
terms in favor of their own interests
than can ever be secured by such indirection and evasion. What the railways
need most of all things for their own security, is a fair and just code of railway
rules and regulations, and to have it
fairly and justly enforced by the courts.
This they might effect if they would
only attempt it in earnest, both in the
states and in Congress. There are men
enough in all legislative bodies to draw
such a code, whom the companies need
not fear to trust,and it would relieve them
from much embarrassment and litiga-

tion, and from doing so much service
without pay, on account of the intense
competition on the long lines, which
often compels them to overcharge their
way business, because the through business is done without pay. But so long
as this mad conflict is kept up, under the
lead of the basest men in the countrythe lobbyists-there will be small hope
of any effective relief. The courts will
be left to do the best they can under a
system of law framed and matured under
a totally different state of things, before
railways existed. And owing to its wonderful adaptability to all circumstances,
no doubt, much may be done by a wise
and prudent administration of the common law. But more perfect justice
might be effected through legislation,
with the co-operation of the companies.
It seems clearly enough settled, that it
is the duty of common carriers, at common law, to carry for all who wish tc
employ them, and for reasonable compensation. It seems to be agreed that at
common law the carrier was CCbound by
law," as said in Harrisv. Packwood, 3
Taunt. 264, "to carry everythingwhich
is brought to him for a reasonable sum,
* * and not to extort what he will."
This, it has been very properly held,
will not preclude him from discriminating in his charges, where there is any
just ground for the discrimination.
Fitchburg Railw. v. Gage, 12 Gray 393:
Ch. 4- Alton Railw. v. 71e People, S. C
of Illinois, 5 Chicago Legal News 266
LAWRENCE, Ch. J. here said : "Anoth
er perfectly well-settled rule of the corn
mon law, in regard to common carriers,
is, that they shall not exercise any unjust and injurious discrimint.tion between individuals in their rates of toll."
The same principle is recognised in Vincent v. Chic. 4- Alton Railw., 49 Ill. 33.
So also in People v. Same Co., 55 Ill.
95, and in Ch. 4- N. W. By. v. People,
56 Ill. 365. But this very point did not
arise in the principal case.
The only point here decided is whether
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it is competent for one railway company
to enter into a contract with anothcr
company, having running powers over
its road, to cease carrying for others,
whenever it falls in arrears in the payment of the stipulated sum for compensation for the use of the track. It
Nould seen, there could be but one answer given to such a question, when
arising, as in this case, upon an application to a court of equity for specific
enforcement of the contract. It has always been regarded as of the very essence of the duty of common carriers,
an essential element in their very definition, that they should be ready to carry
for all who desired to employ them.
Without this they would cease to be
common carriers. And as railways are
created solely for the performance of

this duty in regard to goods and passen
gers, a decree of a court of equity forbidding this, would defeat the primary
vurpose of the charter. And the excuse
tnat the company has entered into a contract not to carry for any but a particular party, in a given contingency, would
no more justify or excuse such a decree.
than a contract on the part of a man not
to support his family will excuse him for
the failure to do so. Contracts made by
natural or corporate persons in conflict
with the very principles for which they
exist, i. e. to perform their duties, publie or private, must of course be held
illegal-at least to the extent of not requiring specific performance in a court
of equity.
L F. R.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
WILLIAM HAMILTON v. HARMAN WINDOLF.
No action will lie for distraining for more rent than is due and in arrear.
In an action of trespass for an alleged injury to the plaintiff's wall by inserting
joists into it, evidence by the defendant that the wall was so used by him in the
erection of an adjoining building under an express parol agreement with the
plaintiff, is not admissible under the general issue plea, in bar of the action, but
is admissible in mitigation of damages.
Parol proof of a license specially pleaded to an action of trespass, is admissible
in bar of the right to recover.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.
In May, 1869, the appellant sub-leased to the appellee a lot
of ground in the city of Baltimore, in consideration of the sum
of $1200, and the payment of the annual rent of $36.
In September, 1869, the appellant commenced the erection of several
houses on the ground to the west of the appellee's house. At the
trial below, the appellant testified that before he built the house
adjacent to the appellee's, the appellee entered into a verbal

agreement with him to purchase said house after it should have
been placed under roof, at the cost of erection and ten per cent.
ailditional, and requested him to build no chimneys and to use
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the west wall of his, the appellee's house; that in pursuance of
this agreement he, the appellant, made use of the west wall of the
appellee's house, building no east wall and no chimneys; that
when the house was under roof he offered it to the appellee according to the agreement, but he declined to take it, allegirg that
he had no money to pay for it. Subsequently the appellant built
chimneys to the house. In addition to the proof of the plaintiff
set out in the opinion of the Court, he proved there were about
forty or forty-five joists inserted to the depth of four inches into
his wall; that he had a new roof put on his house-the one on
the front costing $48, and the one on the back building, $15.
Suit was brought and a judgment for $140.96 recovered by the
appellee against the appellant.
William if. A. Hamilton and Bichard Hami7ton, for the appellant.
. D. McFarland,for the appellee.
An action is maintainable by a tenant against his landlord for
distraining for more rent than is due. Taylor's Landlord and
Tenant, pl. 729.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
ALVEY, J.-The declaration in this case contains two counts;
and in regard to the first it is rather difficult to determine whether
it was intended to be in trespass for an illegal distress, or in case,
for an excessive distress. As intended for either form of action it
is certainly very imperfectly drawn. The second count is for a
direct injury done to the plaintiff's wall, and is framed in trespass.
The case was tried upon the general issue plea, that the defend
ant did not commit the wrongs alleged.
At the trial below seven exceptions were taken, but only two
or three are important to be decided on this appeal.
The plaintiff gave in evidence, in support of the first count in
his declaration, the sub-lease to himself from the defendant, dated
the 3d of May, 1869, of the premises in respect of which the rent
was alleged to be due, whereby the plaintiff agreed to pay the
defendant the yearly rent of $36, accounting the same from the
first of January, 1869, in equal instalments of $18 each, on the
1st of January and July respectively, in every year during the
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continuance of the lease ; the defendant reserving to himself the
right of distress for any arrearages of the rent agreed to be paid.
The plaintiff also gave in evidence certain distress proceedings,
dated the 17th of January, 1871, taken by the defendant against
the goods of the plaintiff, for the sum of $72, rent alleged to be
then in arrear under the lease to the plaintiff; and also proved,
by the constable to whom the distress warrant was directed, that
the same had been levied; but neither the schedule of the goods
taken, nor their value, is made to appear. The constable also
proved that after levying the distress, the plaintiff had paid the
amount of rent claimed to be due, without making any objection
to it.
The plaintiff further proved, for the purpose of showing that
the distress had been taken for more than was actually due, that
the defendant had rendered him an account of the rent in arrear.
in which a credit of $25 had been given, and that he was entitled
to such credit for money received by the defendant to his, the
plaintiff's use; thus reducing the amount of the rent claimed by
the defendant, and for which he had taken the distress.
It is not claimed, nor pretended, by the plaintiff that no rent
whatever was due for which distress could be taken. On the
contrary, the point of grievance is, that distress was taken for
more than was due, if proper credit had been given. Some rent,
it is conceded, was due and in arrear.
Proceeding upon this theory of his rights, the plaintiff, by his
first prayer, asking the Court to instruct the jury, which wae
done accordingly, that if they should find that the distress had
been levied, as stated in the evidence, and that the defendant
declared his purpose to remove the goods distrained, unless the
rent claimed to be due was paid; and that the plaintiff did pay
the amount of rent claimed, with the costs of distress ; and should
further find that the said sum of $72 was not due and in arrear
from the plaintiff to the defendant for rent; then the plaintiff was
entitled to recover, under the first count in the declaration, such
actual damage as the jury might find the plaintiff' to have sustained.
On the other hand, the defendant prayed the Court to instruct
the jury, which was refused, that if they should find that the
defendant distrained for more rent than was really due and owing,
and that such distress was made as testified to by the constable
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Hayne, and others, then it was legal, and the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover under the first count of the declaration.
The question thus presented, on the pleading and evidence, is,
whether the distress, taken for a larger sum than was due at the
time (assuming such to be the case), was legal, or whether it was
void, rendering the defendant liable as for a trespass.
It will be observed that by the instruction given, the plaintiff
necame entitled to the verdict upon the finding by the jury of the
fact that the distress had been made for $72, and that that precise amount was not due at the time. By showing the amount
due to be less, however trifling less, than the amount for which
the distress was levied, the plaintiff, under this instruction, became entitled to recover. This is clearly not justified by the
law, as it is now well settled. The prayer of the defendant, as to
the plaintiff's right to recover under the first count of the declara
tion, should have been granted.
In the case of Taylor v. Henniker, 12 Adol. & Ellis 488 (40
E. C. L. R. 105), it was decided by the Queen's Bench, notwithstanding some previous cases to the contrary, that a distress
taken for more than was due was unlawful in its inception, aid
that an action would lie at common law for such a wrong. But
that decision came to be deliberately reviewed in the case of
Tancred v. Leyland, 16 Adol. & Ellis, N. S., 680 (71 E. C.
L. R.), and was overruled; and, in the last-mentioned case, it was
decided that the simple fact of making a distress for an amount
larger than that really due, and selling the goods under such
claim, is not actionable. This case of Tancred v. Leyland has
been followed by several others, after very full discussion of the
question.
In the case of Glynn v. Thomas, 11 Exch. 870, the declara.
tion alleged that the plaintiff held certain premises as tenant to
the defendant, and that the latter wrongfully distrained certain
goods of the plaintiff, as a distress for an alleged amount of rent
then due; and that the defendant wrongfully remained in possession of such goods, under color of the distress, until the plaintiff
was compelled to pay, and did pay, to the defendant the pretended arrears of rent and costs of the distress, in order to regain
possession of the goods; whereas, in truth, only a small part of
the pretended arrears of rent was due. It was held, after much
consideration, that this declaration disclosed no cause of action;
VOL. XXI.-19
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for as the distress was lawful, the defendant was entitled to a
tender of the amount really due, and upon his refusal to accept
that sum, the plaintiff's proper course was to replevy the goods.
It was there said, however, to be clear law, as it undoubtedly is,
that if the untrue claim had been followed by a sale of more of
the goods taken than was sufficient to raise the amount of rent
really in arrear, with legal charges, a sufficient cause of action
would have arisen. In such case, the goods would not be subject
to replevin after sale.
In reference to the taking and detention of the goods by the
defendant, and the payment by the plaintiff of the amount of rent
claimed to be due, in order to regain possession of his goods, the
Court said: "It is alleged, however, in the count before us,
that the plaintiff was compelled to make payment, and did make
it, in order to regain possession of his goods ; and this allegation
being taken to be true, we must assume now such a state of facts
as would have proved it, if put in issue. But the fact necessary
for that purpose would be merely that the plaintiff demanded the
goods, and that the defendant refused to deliver them, unless the
alleged arrears with the charges of the distress were paid, and
that the payment was made in consequence. Still this would not
make the demand extortionate, or the payment such as could be
recovered back in this form of action, unless from these facts it
followed that the detention of the goods became unlawful. Now
as some rent was due, the taking was lawful; and as the taking
was lawful, so was the detention until the sum really due, with
enough to cover the lawful charges was ten-lered."
The declaration in the present case alleges that the distress
was maliciously made; but that can make no difference; for in
the case of Stevenson v. NYewnham, 13 0. B. 297, an action
against a landlord for distraining for more rent than was really
due, and where a similar allegation of malice was made, the Court
said that such allegation was wholly immaterial, for an act which
does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it
may be done with a bad motive or intent.
The cases of Tancred v. Leyland and Glynn v. Thomas have
both been recently referred to and sanctioned by this Court, in
the case of ean v. ,Spurrier, 35 Ald. 110, where the question
of the legality of a distress was involved.
There is but one other question of importance to be decided in
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this case, and that arises under the sixth exception, and also on
the defendant's second prayer, contained in the seventh exception.
In regard to the alleged injury to the wall of the plaintiff,
complained of as a trespass in the second count of the declaration, the defendant offered to prove, in bar of the right of action
therefor, that such wall was used by him in the erection of an ad.
joining building, in the manner testified to, under and by authority
of an express parol agreement with the plaintiff; the plaintiff
agreeing and directing that the wall should be used in the manner it was by the defendant. This evidence was excluded, as being
insufficient under the pleadings, to bar the right to recover for the
alleged trespass, but was admitted in mitigation of damages.
We think the Court committed no error in ruling as it did in
regard to this question. The case was tried on the general issue
plea alone. If license had been specially pleaded, as must be
done in actions of trespass when the defendant seeks to justify
by the authority of the plaintiff, or those under whom he claims
(1 Chit. P1. 491, 505), the evidence offered would have been
clearly admissible in bar of the right to recover. The right to
maintain the plea of license by such evidence as was here offered,
is fully sustained by the authorities; the Statute of Frauds in
such case not applying: Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East 611;
Carrington v. Boots, 2 M. & W. 248; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 628 ;
Crane v. Gough, 4 Md. 316. But license from the plaintiff not
having been specially pleaded, the evidence was inadmissible to
defeat the action, under the general issue simply. It was properly admitted, however, in mitigation of damages.
It follows, from what we have said in reference to the admissibility of this evidence, that the defendant's second prayer was
properly refused by the court below.
The judgment will be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

United States District Court, Southern -Districtof New York.
THE STEAMSHIP CIRCASSIAN.
A material-man furnishing supplies to a domestic vessel in a home port has no
lien by the general maritime law.
Such a lien may exist by the law of the state where the supplies are furnished,
but it can be enforced in rem only by the United States courts.

Where such a lien exists by the local law, it may now, under admiralty rule
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12, as amended in 1872, be enforced by the United States courts by a libel
in rem.

But that amended rule does not apply to cases where the supplies were furnished
before the amendment went into effect.
History of Rule 12, and the decisions under it.

THIS was a libel filed to recover against the steamship Circas
sian the sum of $3936 for coal and wood furnished to her at New
York, in October 1866, she being then a domestic vessel, owned
in New York, and bound on a voyage to Europe. The debt was
contracted'at the "requestof the agent of the vessel, the supplies
were put on board of the vessel, and receipted for by the master.
they were proper supplies for her intended voyage, and credit
was, in fact, given to the vessel, because of the want of pecuniary
responsibility of the owner of the vessel. The libellants supposed
at the time that the statute of New York would give them a lien
which they could enforce by proceedings in rem against the vessel,
according to the mode prescribed by that statute. The libel
alleged that the claim was by the maritime law, a lien on the
vessel, and also that it was, at the time the supplies were furnished, and now is a lien on the vessel by the law of the state ot
New York.
W. W. Goodrich and W. B. Beebe, for libellant.
V. A. Butler and T. -.

Stillman, for claimant.

BLATCHFORD, J. [After stating the facts.]-After the decision in the case The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, in 1819, it
was no longer open to question, in the courts of the United
States, that, where necessaries are furnished to a vessel in the
port or state where she belongs, the general maritime law does
not give to the party furnishing them a lien on the vessel herself
for his security. The point arose directly, in that case, and was
necessarily decided. The vessel was owned in Baltimore, and the
supplies were furnished to her at Baltimore. The Supreme Court
held that there was no lien by the law of Maryland. This being
so, there was no lien at all, and no foundation for the suit, which
was one in rem, unless there was a lien by the general maritime
law. The Supreme Court decided that there was no lien by the
general maritime law. This decision has been recognised as a
correct one in numerous cases since, which have come before the
Supreme Court, to and including the case of The KHalorama, 10
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Wall. 204, 208, 211, at the December Term, 1869, in which last
case it is said that "the question was put at rest" by the decision
in the case of The General Smith. It had become a rule of
property, established for nearly fifty years, when the supplies in
the present case were furnished.
In the opinion of the court, in the case of The General Smith,
is was remarked that, "in respect to repairs and necessaries in
the port or state to which the ship belongs, the case is governed
altogether by the municipal law of that state, and no lien is implied, unless it is recognised by that law." This remark was
understood to suggest that, where the municipal law of the state
gave or recognised the lien, it would be enforced in the Admiralty
Court. Accordingly, in the case of Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet.
324, in 1833, it was held that the District Court had jurisdiction
of a suit in rem against a vessel for materials supplied and work
performed, in repairing her at New Orleans, on the ground that
the contract was a maritime contract, that the service was to be
performed within the ebb and flow of the tide, and, therefore,
within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and that the local law
of Louisiana gave a lien in the case.
In Steamboat Orlean8 v. Phkebu., 11 Pet. 175, in 1887, it was
stated that the decision in Peyroux v. Howard proceeded on the
ground that, where the contract was a maritime one and the state
law gave a lien, the Admiralty had, in the first place, jurisdiction of the contract, as a maritime one, and then, finding that the
lien had, by the state law, attached, would enforce such lien
according to the mode of administering remedies in the Admiralty.
The jurisdiction of the Admiralty was regarded as vesting under
the laivs of the United States, and not under the local law of the
state, the latter law only conferring the right to a lien, which the
Admiralty, having jurisdiction of the maritime contract, would
enforce by the appropriate Admiralty remedy. Accordingly, the
court decided that the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction of a
suit in rem against &vessel, to recover a claim by a master for his
wages, as master, and for necessaries advanced by him to the
vessel, while he acted as master, because the services and disbursements were not maritime, and that it made no difference
that a lien was given by the local law, so long as the contract
was not maritime.
Following out these principles, it was stated by the Supreme
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Court, in People'sFerry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 402, in 1857,
that it had never sanctioned the doctrine that Admiralty jurisdiction in rem existed against a vessel, to enforce a carpenter's
bill for work and materials furnished in constructing the vessel,
because a lien had been created by the local law of the state
where the vessel was built.
At the December Term, 1844, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of what it regarded as the authority given to it by the sixth
section of the Act of August 23d, 1842 (5 U. S. Stat. at Large
518), to prescribe and regulate the forms of process and the forms
and modes of framing proceedings and pleadings, and generally
the forms and modes of proceeding to obtain relief, and generally
to regulate the whole practice in suits in Admiralty in the Federal
Courts, promulgated the following rule, to take effect from the
1st of September 1845, as a rule for the regulation and government of the practice of the Circuit and District Courts of the
United States in suits in Admiralty on the instance side of the
courts: "Rule 12. In all suits by material-men for supplies
or repairs, or other necessaries, for a foreign ship, or for a ship
in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship
and freight in rem, or against the master or owner alone in personam. And the like proceeding in rem shall apply to cases of
domestic ships, where, by the local law, a lien is given to material-men for supplies, repairs or other necessaries." This rule
recognised, in regard to domestic vessels, the principles as to liens
which the Supreme Court understood to be recognised by the
-2ases of The General Smith, Peyroux v. Boward, and Steamboat
Orleans v. Phcebus, and established no new rule or practice.
Those principles were, that where repairs were made or necessaries were furnished to a vessel in the port or state to which she
belonged, the case was governed by the local law of the state,
and no lien was implied unless it was recognised by that law;
but that if the local law gave the lien, it might be enforced iii
Admiralty. The Supreme Court stated the principles in those
terms, in 1847, in New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v.
Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 391.
At the December Term, 1858, in Allen v. Newberry, 21 How.
244, the Supreme Court held that the District Court for Wis.
consin had no jurisdiction of a libel in ren against a vessel for
the loss of goods shipped on board of the vessel at one port in
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Wisconsin, to be delivered at another port in Wisconsin, ai'd, at
the same term, in iaguirev. Card, Id. 248, it held that the District Court for California had no jurisdiction of a suit in rem
against a vessel to recover for coal furnished to it in California,
it being engaged in trade exclusively within California, although
a lien for the coal was the given by local law of California. The
court then proceeded, at the same term, to repeal the 12th Rule
of December Term, 1844, and to substitute in its place the following rule of practice, to take effect from May 1st 1859 : "In all
suits by material-men for supplies or repairs, or other necessaries, for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign port, the
libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem or
against the master or owner alone in yersonam. And the like
proceeding in personam, but not in rem, shall apply to cases of
domestic ships, for supplies, repairs or other necessaries." The
first sentence of the new rule was in the same words as the first
sentence of the old rule. The second sentence of the old rule
read as follows: "And the like proceeding in rem shall apply to
cases of domestic ships, where, by the local law, a lien is given to
material-men for supplies, repairs or other necessaries." The
words in italics in the old rule were omitted in enacting the new
rule, and the words in italics in the new rule were inserted in
enacting that rule. By the new rule, the court iuitended to provide, and did provide, that a proceeding in rem should not be
allowed in the Admiralty against a domestic ship, for supplies,
repairs or other necessaries, furnished to her, even though 1
lien on the vessel was given therefor to the material-men by the
local law. The right to proceed in rem against the vessel in the
Admiralty, in the case of Maguire v. Card, was given by the
letter of the old rule, then in force, but the court held that it
did not extend to a contract growing out of the purely internal
commerce of a state, and not extending to or affecting other
states.or foreign countries. It is also said, in its opinion in the
case, referring to the new 12th Rule, that it had provided, by
that rule, for leaving all liens which depended on the state laws,
and did not arise out of maritime contracts, to be enforced by the
state courts.
The purport and meaning of the new 12th Rule were explained
by the Supreme Court in the case of The St. Lawrence, 1 Black
522, in 1861. The case was one of supplies furnished to a domestic
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vessel, at New York, in regard to which a lien on the vessel had
been acquired under the local law, and a suit in rem, to enforce
the lien, had been brought in the District Court, against the vessel,
before the new 12th Rule took effect. The Supreme Court held
that the libellant was entitled to a decree. It upheld the jurisdiction of the Admiralty to enforce such a lien, founded on a maritime
ontract, even though the lien was created by the local law, and
did not exist as a maritime lien. It stated that the alteration in
the 12th Rule applied altogether to the process to be used, and
had no relation to the question of jurisdiction ; that, in reference
to the enforcement of a maritime contract, justiciable in the
Admiralty, Congress, and the Supreme Court, by authority of
Congress, had a right to prescribe whether the jurisdiction should
be exercised by an attachment of property, or merely by a suit
against a person, or by both; that the contract, if maritime, was
equally within the jurisdiction of a Court of Admiralty, whether
process against the vessel were issued, because the supplies were
presumed to be furnished on her credit, under the maritime code,
or because a lien on the vessel therefor was given by the local
law, or whether only process against the person were issued,
because the supplies were presumed, by the maritime code, to be
furnished on the personal credit of the master or owner of the
vessel, and no lien therefor was given by the local law; that the
old 12th Rule, as well as the new 12th Rule, was merely "a rule
of practice ;" that a lien given by a state law was enforced in the
Admiralty, not as a right which the Admiralty Court was bound
to carry into execution on the application of the party, but as a
discretionary power; and that the repeal of the old 12th Rule
proceeded on the ground that it was not convenient or practicable
for the Admiralty Court to enforce liens which rested on the local
law for their support. The old 12th Rule was held to apply to
cases commenced before the new 12th Rule took effect, and the
new 12th Rule was held not to apply to such cases.
At the December Term, 1866, the Supreme Court, in Thelloses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, had under consideration a statute of the state
of California, which made a vessel liable for services, supplies, materials, and some other matters of contract, and sundry tort', ana
constituted such causes of action liens on the vessel and authorized
actions for such causes to be brought directly against the veszel, by
name, with an attachment of her, and, if a judgment should be
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recovered, a sale of her, to satisfy the judgment. The Court held
that such statute, to the extent in which it authorized actions in
rem against vessels for causes of action cognisable in the Admiralty,
invested the Courts of California with Admiralty jurisdiction; that
the cognisance by the Federal Courts of civil causes of Admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction had been made exclusive by Congress;
and that the state court of California had no jurisdiction of a proceeding in.rem against a vessel, under such statute, for a breach of
contract by her owner to transport a passenger from New York to
San Francisco.
In the case of The Hine v. Trevor, at the same term, 4 Wallace
555, S. c. 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 586, the Supreme Court had
under consideration a statute of Iowa, which gave a lien on a
vessel for injury to property by such vessel, and authorized the
seizure and sale of the vessel therefor, without any process against
her owner or master. It held that a state court of Iowa had no
jurisdiction, under that statute, of such direct proceeding against
a vessel for such a cause of action, for the reason that the cause
of action was one of Admiralty cognisance, and within the exulusive jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts of the United States.
In March 1869, the Court of Appeals of this state, in the case
of The Steamboat Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19, following the two decisions in 4 Wallace, held that a proceeding against a vessel, by
name, in a state court in New York, under the New York statute
of April 24th 1862 (Laws of 1862, chap. 482), on a lien given by
such statute for supplies furnished to the vessel, was void, for
want of jurisdiction, because exclusive cognisance of such a proceeding belonged to the District Courts of the United States, the
contract being a maritime one. This view was reiterated by the
same court, in Brookman v. Hamill, in May 1871, 43 N. Y.
554. Judge RAPALLO, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in
that case, says, with great accuracy: "Although our Courts of
Admiralty may not recognise the lien of material-men for supplies to domestic vessels, not deeming the credit given to the
vessel, they have retained jurisdiction over the subject of these
claims, and whatever restrictions now exist as to the remedy are
self-imposed by our own courts, and do not arise from any lack
of jurisdiction over the subject. In view of the doctrine of the
case of The St. Lawrence I can see no want of power in the
Supreme Court, should it see fit so do, tn restore the Rule of
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1844, or to allow a remedy in rem to material-men in all cases.
And, if the necessities of commerce require that, in:
this country, there should be a remedy in rem in all cases of ma.
terial-men, it is much more appropriate that it should be administered by the Courts of Admiralty, than under the laws which
may, from time to time, be in force in the several states, especially in respect to vessels not engaged exclusively in the internal
commerce of a state, but which may be subject to liabilities incurred in different states, or in foreign countries, in favor of persons other than the attaching creditor."
In this state of the decisions, the Supreme Court, on the 6th
of May 1872, amended the 12th Rule, so as to make it read ae
follows : " In all suits by material-men, for supplies or repairs,
or other necessaries, the libellant may proceed against the ship
and freight in rem, or against the master or owner alone in personam." The 12th Rule of May 1, 1859, which was so amended,
read thus: " In all suits by material-men for supplies or repairs,
or other necessaries, for a foreign ship, or for a ship in aforeign
port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in
rem, or against the master or owner alone inpersonam. And
the like proceeding in personam, but not in rem, shall apply to
cases of domestic ships, for supplies, repairs or other necessaries."
The words in italics above, in the Rule of 1859, were stricken
out, and that was the only change made, to arrive at the Rule of
1872.
What is the meaning and effect of the Rule of 1872 ? The
Rule of 1859, recognising the law of the courts of the United
States as to maritime liens for supplies, &c., gave process
in rem or in personan, optionally, in case of supplies, &c., to a
foreign ship, or a ship in a foreign port; and gave process in personam, but not in ren, in ease of supplies, &c., to a domestic ship.
Jurisdiction of all contracts for such supplies, &c., belongs to Courts
of Admiralty of the United States, under the Constitution and
statutes, because such contracts are contracts of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, but process in rem was allowed, by the
Rule of 1859, only in case of a foreign ship, and was refused in
the case of a domestic ship. The Rule of 1872 provides, and was
inltended to provide, that, in every ease of a contract for supplies,
&e., to a vossel dlomestic or foreign, being a nmaritine contract,
process in rem against the vessel, or in personiam against her
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master or owner, may, optionally, be resorted to, where a suit is
required to enforce the contract.
The libel in this case was filed on the 21st of May 1872. The
coal was furnished in 1866. The suit was brought after the
Rule of 1872 went into effect, but the supplies were furnished
before that rule went into effect. When the supplies were furnished no process in rem could be issued against the vessel therefor. The.re was no lien on the vessel therefor by the general
maritime law, and the 12th Rule of 1859 forbade the issuing of
process in rem against the vessel, because she was a domestic
vessel. The contract was made in view of this state of things,
and no remedy in rem existed under the state law, because the
provision thetefor was void. The Rule of 1872 now comes into
effect. But, in the absence of all words indicating an intention
that the rule shall apply to cases of supplies, &c., furnished
before the rule took effect, it must be held, on familiar principles
of interpretation, to apply only to cases of supplies, &c., furnished after it takes effect. The same principle which always
applies to the interpretation of a statute must be applied to the
construing of this rule. All statutes are to be considered prospective, unless the language is express to the contrary, or there
is a necessary implication to that effect: Urted States v. Heth,
8 Cranch 399; .arvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 347. There is
nothing in the Rule of 1872 to indicate an intention to give a
remedy in rem against a domestic vessel where the supplies, &c.,
were furnished before the rule took effect.
Another consideration is of force. The Supreme Court on the
6th of May 1872, expressly state that they amend the 12th Rule
of 1859 so as to read thus and so. They do not repeal the 12th
Rule of 1859. By their order of May 1st 1859, they repealed
the 12th Rule of December Term, 1844, and prescribed a new
12th Rule. The 12th Rule of 1859 is amended from and after
May 6th 1872, so as to read in the new form thereafter, in respect
to suits to be brought thereafter, for supplies, &c., to be furnished
thereafter. In respects to suits brought before May '6th 1872,
and on or after May 1st 1859, for supplies, &c., furnished between
those dates, and in respect to suits brought on or after May 6th
1872, for supplies, &c., furnished before May 6th 1872, and
after the 12th Rule of 1859 went into operation, that rule is to
goarn ; for, it is still left in force in respect to cases not covered
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by the amendment of 1872. That rule expressly forbides process in rem in the present case.
It results that the libel must be dismissed, with costs.

United States District Court, District of Maryland.
IN RE ESTATE OF KIRKLAND, CHASE & CO., BANKRUPTS.
Ship carpenters have a lien for repairs made to a domestic vessel which may be
enforced by a proceeding in rem.
The "Rules of Practice," of the Supreme Court in Admiralty proceedings, are
merely intended to regulate tile remedy, and have no relation to the question of
jurisdiction.

The amendment to the 12th Rule, providing that material-men furnishing supplies or repairs may proceed against tle ship and freight in rem, is applicable to
all suits instituted since Mlay, 1872, for supplies or repairs, no matter whether they
were furnished before or since tile adoption of the amendment.
Remedial statutes which do not impair contracts nor disturb absolute vested
rights, may be retroactive in their effect without being unconstitutional.

THIS was a petition filed against the assignee in bankruptcy of
Kirkland, Chase & Co., by Wellend & Buck, ship carpenters,
claiming payment, as preferred creditors, out of the proceeds of
the sale of a vessel to which they had made repairs.
J. Stewart and F. J. Brown, for petitioners.
Brown & Brune, contrA.
GILES, J.-Three objections have been raised to the relief asked
in this case. The first objection is, that it does not appear that
the repairs were made on the credit of the vessels. There is no
force in this objection. The repairs were originally charged on
the books of the petitioners to the different vessels, and one of the
firm swears that they were always made on the credit of the
respective vessels and on the orders of the master. It is true the
ship carpenters subsequently made out a general account against
the firin of Kirkland, Chase & Co., including these different repairs;

but I am of the opinion that the cases of Tie Grapeshot and The
Guy, 9 Wall. 129 and 758, and the cases of The Lult, K47orana
amd Custer, 10 Wall. 192 and 204, and The Pataseo,1.3 Wall.
;29, dispose of this objection.
The next point raised by the learned counsel for the defendants
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is, that these being domestic vessels, there is no lien on them for
those repairs which can be enforced by a proceeding in rem in
this court. That the Supreme Court had no constitutional
authority to give such a lien on a domestic vessel by its 12th
Rule. And as, in this state, no such lien existed by the state law,
and none was given by the general maritime law, there can be no
remedy in rem for such a claim.
Now, if this was a question of jurisdiction, I should agree with
the learned counsel; for neither Congress nor the Supreme Court,
in framing rules by its authority, could enlarge the jurisdiction
of the Courts of the United States. That jurisdiction must be
found in the Constitution or it cannot exist. For this principle
see the learned opinion of the late Chief Justice in the case of
The Genesee Chief, in 12 Howard. But are not these rules
merely rules which regulate the remedy and have no relation to
the question of jurisdiction? They have been formed by the
Supreme Court in virtue of the power given by Congress to that
high tribunal by the Act of August 23, 1842. They are called
by that Court "Rule4 of Practice," &c. And in the case of %.
Lawrence, 1 Black 526, that Court maintained the validity of
these rules as rules regulating the process and practice of the
Admiralty Courts of this country. I think that authority disposes
of the second objection.
The third point raised applies to all that part of the repairs
made by the petitioners to said vessels prior to the 6th May 1872,
the day on which the Supreme Court passed the present rule. The
order is as follows: "Amendment to the 12th Bule in Admiralty.Ordered, that this rule be amended so as to read as follows: In
all suits by material-men for supplies or repairs or other necessa-.
ries, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem
or against the master or owner alone in personam." In the
original rules framed by the Supreme Court it was provided that
they should only go into operation on the 1st of September 1845,
several months after their adoption by the court. In changing
the 12th Rule in 1858 it was provided that the new rule was not
to be in force until from and after the 1st May 1859. In the
case of St. Lawrence the libel in rem had been filed before the
change in the rule, and for this cause the court sustained it and
decreed in favor of the libellant.
As the rule now stands the question is, Is it applicable to all
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suits instituted by material-men for supplies or repairs, no matter
when made, or only to cases brought to enforce the payment of
claims for supplies, &c., furnished since the passage of the rule ?
It would appear to me from the language of the rule that it
embraces all suits instituted after its adoption. Could not the
court do this ? Say the court in the case of the St. Lawrence,
p. 527, "Yet Congress may undoubtedly prescribe the forms and
mode of proceeding in the judicial tribunals it establishes to
carry this power into execution, and may authorize the court to
proceed by attachment against the property, or by tise arrest of the
person, as the legislature shall deem most expedient to promote
the purposes of justice." Now these rules, adopted by the court
in virtue of the Act of 1842, have all the force of a statute. If
I am right that these rules only affect the practice and process of
the court, then there could be no valid objection in applying said
12th Rule to all suits instituted after its adoption. It is said by
the Supreme Court in Sturgis v. Crowninshield,4 Wheat. 122,
"The distinction between the obligation of the contract and
the remedy given by the legislature to enforce it has been taken
at the bar, and exists in the nature of things."
This principle is again recognised by the court in the case of
1iason v. H7aile, 12 Wheat. 370; and in 1 Kent's Com. 455, that
learned jurist says: "A retrospective statute, affecting and
changing vested rights, is very generally considered in this country
as founded on unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void. But this doctrine is not understood to apply
to remedial statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature,
provided they do not impair contracts or disturb absolute vested
rights, and go only to confirm rights already existing, and in
furtherance of the remedy by curing defects and adding to the
means of enforcing existing obliqations."
This rule is recognised and affirmed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Ross et al. v. -Duval,13 Peters 63. The same princ1ple was asserted and maintained in a very able opinion by the
late Judge MARTIN in the Court of Appeals of this state in
Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill 302. And a similar question arising
in the statute of 3d and 4th Victoria, ch. 65, see. 6. has been
decided by Dr. LUSIIINGTON in the High Court of Admiralty of
Ei gland. That statute enacted "That the High Court of Admiraltj shall have jurisdiction to decide all claims whatsoever in
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the nature of salvage far services rendered to, or damage received
by, any ship or sea-going vessel, or in the nature of tonnage, or for
necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or sea-going vessel, and
to enforce the payment thereof, &c., &c. A protest to the jurisdiction was entered in the case because the supplies were furnished
to the vessel prior to the passage of the statute. Dr. LUSHrINGTON
says: "I do not find any expression limiting the jurisdiction of
the court to cases occurring subsequent to the period when the
act came into operation," and he overruled the protest: Alexander, 1 Wm. Rob. 294.
A like decision was made by the same learned judge in the
case of The Ironsides, 1 Lush. 458.
I am of the-opinion, therefore, that the new rule applies to all
libels in rem by material-men filed after the passage of the said
rule, whether the repairs were made before or after its passage.
I have taken longer time to consider this case than I would
otherwise have done, owing to the fact that upon the last point I
find myself in opposition to a recent decision of Judge BLATCIIFORD,
of the Southern District of New York, a judge of whose legal
learning and ability I entertain the highest opinion.
As the amount involved in this case is large, I hope it may be
taken up in appeal, that I may be reviewed by the court above.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hamp8hire.
HORN v. COLE.
If the owner of goods, to prevent them from being attached as his own, represent
that they belong to another, and the party to whom the representation is made,
relying, and from the circumstances having reason to rely, on the representation as
true, attach the goods for a debt due from the party, to whom it was represented
that the goods belonged, in trover for attaching the goods, the owner will not be
permitted to show that his representation was false, though at the time when be
made it he had no notice of the debt on which the goods were attached, and had
no intention to deceive the party who attached them.

TROVER, against Cole and Green, for beds, crockery, glassware, &o.

It appeared on trial that the plaintiff was contemplating to remove West;
that his son, Charles E. Horn, had removed before, and was residing at
Jefferson, Illinois. The plaintiff packed a box of goods and delivered
them to the freight agent at East Milan, directed to Charles E. Horn,
Jefferson, Illinois, and ordered them to be forwarded by freight on the
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railroad. The box started from Milan in the freight cars on the 29th
of August 1864.
The defbndant Cole, having a note against Charles E. Horn, instituted
a suit on it, and had the box and contents attached on the writ at
Northumberland on the same 29th of August; and the defendant Green
is the officer who made the attachment. The plaintiff brought this suit
on the 31st of the same August. On the 3d of September he procured
a receipter for the goods, and had them forwarded according to the original direction. The suit of Cole against Charles E. Horn was settled
by payment of debt and costs. The plaintiff, on his arrival at Jefferson,
found the box and contents there in good condition. The plaintiff
claimed damages for the detention of the goods, and for consequential
damages.
The plaintiff testified that the goods all belonged to him when they
were delivered to the railroad, and when they were attached.
The defendant Cole testified that the plaintiff, when carrying the box
to the depot, passed by Cole's shop, and that he said to the plaintiff,
"Are you going to leave us, Horn?" that Horn replied, "No; but
Charles had some things at my house, and I took them, and put a few
of my things with them into the box, and am sending them to Charles ;"
that the plaintiff then procured Cole to mark the box, as before stated.
The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff made similar statements
to others, before and after, as to the ownership of Charles E. Horn.
There was no evidence that the plaintiff knew Cole had any demand
against Charles B. Horn.
The defendant Cole also testified that, relying on this representation
to him that the goods belonged to Charles E. Horn, he had procured
his writ and caused the property to be attached as belonging to Charles
E. Horn.
The plaintiff was not indebted to Cole, but there was evidence that
he was indebted to others.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, which the plaintiff
moves the court to set aside,-and contends that, in order that the
plaintiff should be estopped by his statements to show that the goods
were his, the statements must have been made with the knowledge that
Cole had a debt against Charles E. Horn on which the goods might be
attached; and that the plaintiff intended to deceive and defraud Cole.
Fletcher, for the plaintiff, cited Andrews v. L4ons, 11 Allen 349
Cogqgill v. ff. & N. H. Railroad,3 Gray 549 ; Osgood v. .ichols, 5 Id.
420 ; Audenried v. Betteley/, 5 Allen 384; Plumer v. Lord, 9 Id. 455.
Lagdon v. Doud, 10 Id. 437.
Ray, for the defendants.
PERLEY, C. J.-There is no complaint that the rulings and instructions of*the court on the trial were erroneous or improper, provided the
evidence warranted the jury in returning a verdict for the defendants :
and the verdiet must stand, if the evidence was competent to prove suels
representations by the plaintiff as would estop him to set up his title to
the goods attached as the property of Charles E. Iorn.
The evidence reported in the case was competent to prove that the
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plaintiff made the representations on the occasion and in the circumstances testified to by Cole; that the plaintiff, though not indebted to
Cole, was in debt to others; that Cole, believing the representations to
be true, and relying on them as true, caused the goods to be attached
as the property of Charles E. Horn ; and, also, that the plaintiff made
these representations, knowing them to be false, with the intention that
all persons who were interested in the subject should take them'to be
true and act on them as such, and with the intention to mislead and
deceive all to whom the representations were communicated, and induce
them to act on- them as true ; that his intention was to deceive his own
creditors, and prevent, them from taking the goods as his for the debts
which he owed to them. These facts must be taken to have been established by the verdict.
But as there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew Cole had any
demand against Charles E. Horn, we cannot infer that the plaintiff had
Cole in his mind ats an individual whom he meant to deceive by his false
representations, or that he had an intent to prevent Cole from taking
the goods for a debt which he owed to Cole, as he owed no such debt;
and, on the evidence reported, the jury were not at liberty to find that
the plaintiff had Cole in his mind as an individual whom he meant to
deceive and defraud by inducing him to take the goods for his demand
against Charles E. Horn. This raises the point, which the counsel for
the plaintiff takes, whether to estop a party from showing that his representations were false, it is necessary that the false representations should
have been intended to deceive and defraud the individual party who
trusted to them and acted on them, provided there was a general intention to deceive and defraud all persons who were interested in the
subject-matter of the false representations.
, The ground on which a party is precluded from proving that his
representations on which another has acted were false is, that to permit
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience. This has been
sometimes called an equitableestoppel,because the jurisdiction of enforcing
this equity belonged originally and peculiarly to courts of equity, and
does not appear to have been familiarly exercised at law until within a
comparatively recent date; and, so far as relates to suits at law affecting
the title to land, I understand that in England and in some of the
United States the jurisdiction is still confined to courts of equity : Storrs
v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166, 168; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. ]74. 178;
Pckard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469. The doctrine, however, is a very
old head of equity, and is recognised and applied in a great number of
the early cases: .Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Ch. Cases 108; Teasdale v. !easdale,
13 Yiner Abr. 539; Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vernon 136; Gale v. Lindo, Id.
475; ffunsden v. C]hey ney, 2 Id. 150; Lamlee v. Hanman, Id. 499;
Raw v. Pote, Id. 239; Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. 264; East Ind. Co.
v. Vincent, 2 Atkins 83; Stiles v. Cowper, 3 Id. 693; Farmerv. Wbber,
13 Viner Abr. 525 ; 2 Brown's Parl. Cases 88; 2 Eq. Cases Abr. 481 ;
.Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. C. C. 543; Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vt. 366.
Many of these eases related to underhand agreements in fraud of
marriage settlements; but the principle is of general application: 1
Fonblanque Eq. 267, note (x). Relief was given according to the
circumstances of the case,-sometimes by enjoining suits at law, in
which the legal title was set up, and sometimes by decreeing conveyances
VOL. XXI.-20
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and the cancelling of deeds and other instruments; but in all these
cases relief was given in equity contrary to the strict legal rights of the
defendants.
Thus, in the case of an equitable estoppel, a party is not allowed to
assert his strict legal right, because, in the circumstances of the indi.
vidual case, it would be contrary to equity and good conscience. Take
the present case for an illustration. In troyer, following the legal definition of the action, if the plaintiff proves property in himself and
a conversion by the defendant, he has maintained his action, and is
entitled to a verdict and judgment. It is conceded that the plaintiff
owned the goods, and that the defendants converted them. The defence
here set up appeals from the strict rule at law to the equitable doctrine
that a party shall not be allowed to exercise his legal right of proving
the facts, if, on account of his previous declarations or conduct, it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience. So in awrit of entry:
by the technical rules at law, if the demandant proves seisin in himself
and a disseisin by the tenant within the time of limitation, he is entitled
to judgment; but if the demandant, having a dormant title to the land
demanded, concealed his title and encouraged the tenant to purchase
from another, he is not allowed in our practice to set up his legal title,
because it would be contrary to equity and good conscience.
It thus appears that what has been called an equitable estoppel, and
sometimes with less propriety an estoppel iz, pais, is properly and peculiarly a doctrine of equity, originally introduced there to prevent a
party from taking a dishonest and unconscientious advantage of his
strict legal rights,-though now with us, like many other doctrines of
equity, habitually administered at law. But formerly the practice was
different, and suits at law, the courts being incapable of giving effect to
this equity, were often enjoined where the party insisted on his rights
at law contrary to the equitable doctrine, as in Raw v. Pote, Stiles v.
Ciowper, and Farmer v, lVebber, qua szTra.
It would have a tendency to mislead us in the present inquiry, as there
is reason to suspect that it has sometimes misled others, if we should
confound this doctrine of equity with the legal estoppel by natterin pais.
The equitable estoppel and legal estoppel agree indeed in this, that they
both preclude from showing the truth in the individual case. The
grounds, however, on which they do it are not only different, but directly
opposite. The legal estoppel shuts out the truth, and also the equity
and juztice of the individual case, on account of the supposed paramount
importance of rigorously enforcing a certain and unvarying maxim of
the law. For reasons of general policy, a record is held to import
incontrovertible verity,"and for the same reason a party is not permitted
to contradict his solemn admission by deed. And the same is equally
true of legal estoppels by matter in pais. Certain acts done out of court
and without deed were, by a technical and unyielding rule of law,
upheld on like grounds of public policy, and followed always by certain
legal eonsequences. The legal effect of such acts was not permitted to
le emtroverted by proof.
Th,s, if' one accepts a lease and enters under it, lie is estopped to
claim, any other estate in the land during the term ; lie cannot show
that he owned the land when the lease was made. Estoppels by matter
in pmmis were few in number, and all of this general and well-definmed
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character; and they all enforced some technical rule of the law against
the truth; and also against the justice and equity of the individual
ease. COKE, in his examination of the different kinds of estoppel by
matter in pais, enumerates the following: " By livery, by entry, by
acceptance of rent, by partition, and by acceptance of an estate :" Co.
Lit. 352 a. In Lyon v. Reed, 13 MI.& W. 309, PARKE, B., speaking
of legal estoppels by matter in ais, says: "They are but few, and are
pointed out by Lord COKE, Co. Lit. 352 a. They are all cases which
anciently really were, and in contemplation of law have always continued to be; acts of notoriety no less solemn than the execution of a
deed, such as livery; acceptance of an estate, and the like. Whether
a party had or had not concurred in an act of this sort was deemed a
matter which there could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then the
legal consequences follow."
In the authorities which contain the most complete enumeration of
the different kinds of legal estoppels and the fullest discussion of the
law on the subject, I find no allusion to the equitable estoppel which
we are now considering. All legal estoppels, whether by record, by
deed or by matter in pais, depended on strict legal rules, and shut out
proof of the truth and justice of the individual case: Viner's Abr.,
Estoppel, passim; Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W. 309 ; _reeman v. Cooke,
2 Ex. 658.
For this reason, because legal estoppels, whether by record, deed or
matter in ais, shut out proof of the truth and justice of, individual
cases, they have been called odious, and have been construed with much
strictness against parties that set them up. They were formerly required, like other defences regarded as inequitable, to be pleaded with
certainty to a certain intent in every particular. If they were relied on
by way of averment and tried by the jury, the jury might find, and
according to some authorities were bound by their oath veritatem dicere,
to find according to the truth of the case, regardless of the estoppel:
Tralsperpais284; Co. Lit. 227 a; Cor. Dig., Estoppel (S. 5). The
practice is now different, and legal estoppels may be relied on, when
given in evidence, without being specially pleaded. Legal estoppels
exclude evidence of the truth and the equity of the particular case to
support a strict rule of law, on grounds of public policy.
Equitable estoppels are admitted on the exactly opposite ground of
promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a
party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law,
when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity
and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth. The facts
upon which equitable estoppels depend are usually proved by oral evidence; and the evidence should doubtless be carefully scrutinized, and
be full and satisfactory, before it should be admitted to estop the party
from showing the truth, especially in cases affecting the title to land.
But where the facts are clearly proved, the maxim that estoppels are
odious,-which was used in reference to legal estoppels, because they
shut out the truth and justice of the case,-ought not to be applied to
these equitable estoppels, as it has sometimes been, inadvertently as I
think, from a supposed analogy with the legal estoppel by matter in pais,
to which they have, in this respect, no resemblance whatever: Lord
CAMPBELr, in Howard v. Hudson, 2 E. & B. 10; Andrews v. Lyons,
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11 Allen 349, 351. In other cases, where more attention has been paid
to the real nature of this equitable doctrine, it has been held that such
estoppels are not odious, and to be construed strictly, but. are entitled
to a itr and liberal application, like other equitable doctrines which
are admitted to suppress fraud and promote honesty and fiir dealing:
MELLOR and CROMPTON, Justices, in Aslqitelv. Ban,
3 B. & S. 472;
COWEN, J., in Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill 220; Commonwealth v. .Afltz. 10
Barr 530, 531 ; -Buckingham v. Hanna, 2 Ohio St. 557 ; T-an Rensselaer v.
arney, 11 How. 326; Preston v. aT!nn, 25 Conn. 118, 128.
In this equitable estoppel the party is forbidden to sct up his legal
title because he has so conducted himself that to do it would be contrary to equity and good conscience. As in other cases of fraud and
dishonesty, the circumstances out of which the question may arise are
of infinite variety; and, unless courts at law are willing to abdicate the
duty of administering the equitable doctrine effectually in suppression
of fraud and dishonesty, the application of it cannot be confined within
the limit of any narrow technical definition, such as will relieve courts
from looking, as in other cases depending on fraud and dishonesty, to the
circumstances of each individual case. Certain general rules will doubtless apply, as in other cases where relief is sought on such grounds.
But I find myself unable to agree with the authorities where the old
maxim, that legal estoppels are odious, has been applied-to this equitable estoppel, and where attempts have been made to lay down strict
definitions, such as would defeat the remedy in a large proportion of
the cases that fall within the principle on which the doctrine is founded.
The doctrine having been borrowed from equity, courts at law that
have adopted it should obviously look to the practice in equity for their
guide in the application of it; and in equity the doctrine has been
liberally applied to suppress fraud and enforce honesty and fhir dealing,
without any attempt to confine the doctrine within the limits of a strict
definition. For instance, the doctrine has not in equity been limited
to cases where there was an actual intention to deceive. The cases are
numerous where the party who was estopped by his declarations or his
conduct to set up his legal title, was ignorant of it at the time, and of
course could have had no actual intention to deceive by concealing his
title. Yet, if the circumstances were such that he ought to have informed himself, it has been held to be contrary to equity and good
conscience to set up his title, though he was in fact ignorant of it when
he made the representations : H1obbs v. Xorton, lHnsden v. CicynlQI.
TRasdale v. Teasdale, qua sip2ra ; and Bitrrowes v. Lock, 10 Yes. 470.
So if the party knew the facts, but mistook the law : Storrs v. Barker,
6 Johns. Ch. 166. Nor is it necessary in equity that the intenition
should be to deceive any particular individual or individuals. If' the
representations are such, and made in such circumstances, that all
persons interested in the subject have the right to rely on them as true,
their truth cannot be denied by the party that has made them against
any one who has trusted to them and acted on them : Gale v. Lhido,
-Paemerv. TVebbee, quia szqra.
In the much and well considered case of Preston v. ilanm, 25 Conn.
118, 128, STORans, J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The

doctrine of estoppel in lans, notwithstandinz the great number of cases
which have turned upon it and are reported in the books, cannot be
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said even yet to rest upon any determinate legal test which will reconcile the decisions, or will embrace all transactions to which the general
principles of equitable necessity wherein it originated demand that it
should be applied. In fact, it is because it is so peculiarly a doctrine
of practical equity, that its technical application is so difficult, and its
reduction to the form of abstract formulas is still unaccomplished."
This was said in 1856, and little has since been done towards extricating
the doctrine from the confusion and conflict of authority with which it
was then embarrassed. This, as I think, has been caused by the fact
that courts -have continued to exercise their ingenuity in the vain
attempt to compress a broad doctrine of equity within the narrow limits
of a technical definition.
The case of Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469, decided as late as
1837, appears to have been regarded, both in England and in this
country, as the leading case at law on this subject. It was trover by
the mortgagee of personal goods against the defendants, who were purchasers at a sheriff's sale on execution against the mortgagor. The
facts set up in defence were, that the plaintiff was present at the sale,
did not disclose his title as mortgagee, and encouraged the defendants
to purchase. The question on trial was as to the property of the plaintiff in the goods, and Lord DENMAN directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
A rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside was made
absolute.
In delivering the judgment of the court, Lord DENMAN said: "His
[the plaintiff's] title having been established, the property could only be
divested by gift or sale, of which no specific act was even surmised.
But the rule of law is clear, that where one, by his words or conduct,
wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of
things, and induces him to act on that belief so as to alter his own
previous position, the former is concluded from averring a different
state of things as existing at the same time; and the plaintiff might
have parted with his interest in the property by a verbal gift or sale,
without any other formalities that threw technical difficulties in the way
of legal evidence. And we think his conduct in standing by and giving
a kind of sanction to the proceedings under the execution was a fact of
such a nature that the opinion of the jury ought to have been taken
whether he had not, in point of fact, ceased to be the owner."
It is worthy of note, that in this suit at law the court, so late as 1837,
after stating the general equitable doctrine, did not venture to put the
defence directly on the ground that the plaintiff was estopped by his
conduct to prove the truth of the case, but allowed the facts to go to
the jury as evidence that the plaintiff, in some undefined and mysterious
way, had parted with his property in the goods : so late and so reluctant
were the courts to admit in suits at law this defence, which depended
on fraud and dishonesty, and which belonged, originally and appropriately, to the jurisdiction in equity.
It can hardly be supposed that Lord DEN MAN, in the statement
which he made of this equitable doctrine in reference to the facts of
that case, understood that he was laying down a technical definition
fixing the limits of the doctrine, and excluding all cases that did not
come clearly within the terms which he used on that occasion. Nevertheless, these remarks of Lord DENM.AIN have often been treated as a
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sort of authoritative text, covering the whole ground, which it was the
business of courts in later cases to expound and explain. And it is
curious to observe what different and contradictory interpretations have
been put on his statement of the equitable doctrine. It has been cited
in Massachusetts as authority for decisions, in which it has been held
that the representations to estop the party from showing they were not
true must have been made with the intent to deceive, and the intent to
deceive the party who sets up the defence: Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen
455; Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Id. 349. And in California the same case
has been relied on for the rule that where a representation comes in any
way to the ears of a party who acts on it, the party making the representation is estopped to deny its truth unless it had the character of a
confidential communication : Mitchell v. Reed, 9 Cal. 204. In England
it has been treated as a statement of the equitable doctrine made in
reference to the circumstances of that case, and not intended as a formal
and complete definition: Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654; G'egg v.
Wells, 10 A. & E. 90 ; Jorden,v. Money, 5 H. of Ld. Cases 212.
It would be a laborious and not a profitable task to attempt an
analysis of all the recent decisions on this subject. I will briefly advert
to some of those which appear to be the most important.
In Plner v. Lord, 9 Allen 455, it was held that to create an estoppel in _pais the declarations or acts must have been accompanied with a
design to mislead; and Langdon. v. Doud, 10 Allen 433, is to the same
point. In Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Allen 849, the court went one step
further, and decided that the declarations or acts must have been
accompanied with a design to deceive the party who sets up the estoppel, and induce him to act on them; and in. this last case it is said that
such an estoppel shuts out the truth and is odious, and must be strictly
proved. In Hawes v. ifNarchant, 1 Curtis C. C. 144, the rule is laid
down that to be estopped the party must have designedly made admissions inconsistent with the defence or claim which he proposes to set up,
and another, with his knowledge and consent, so acted on this admission
that he will be injured by allowing the admission to be disputed; and
this rule is apparently approved in Audenried v. Betteley, 5 Allen 382.
In these cases, it is to be observed, the court have not been content
with saying, in reference to the facts before them, that if certain things
concurred in the case it would fall within the equitable doctrine, and the
party would be estopped, but they have undertaken to lay down a strict
legal definition of general application, excluding from the operation of
the doctrine all cases that do not fall within the terms of the definition.
Applying the rule, as laid down in Hawes v. Marchant, to the present
ease: if Ihorn had known that Cole bad a demand against Charles E.
IImn, had falsely represented to Cole that the goods belonged to Charles
with the design to deceive him and induce him to attach the goods as
the property of Charles, and Cole, relying on the representation. had
taken the goods as the property of Charles, and as Htorn intended, yet,
if after he had made the false representation he did not know that the
goods were taken as the property of Charles, and assent that they should
be so taken. he would not be estopped to set up his own title in the
,-ods. The statement that another party must have acted on the false
statement with his knowl, tge find assent must mean this, or it can mean
nothing; for he could not know that he had acted on it at all until the
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act was done and accomplished. The remark of Lord CAMPBELL in
Howard v. Hudson, qua supra, though not called for by the case. is to
the effect that the representation must have been intended to deceive.
These authorities would seem to sustain the plaintiff's counsel fully in
his position that the false representation must not only be intended to
deceive, but also to deceive the identical party that acted on them.
There are, however, authorities of equal respectability, and in greater
numbers, which maintain a different doctrine.
In England, the case of Pickardv. Sears does not appear to have
been understood as intended to lay down a complete definition of the
equitable doctrine excluding all cases that could not be brought within
the terms of the remarks made by Lord DENMAN. In Freemanv. Cooke,
2 Ex. 654, it was held that the term wiqully, used in Pickardv. Sears,
was not to be understood in the sense of maliciously; and that whatever
a man's real meaning may be, if he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true, and believe it was
meant he should act on it, and he did act on it as true, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its
truth. This is wholly inconsistent with the notion that an intention
to deceive is an essential ingredient of the representation, which precludes the party making it from showing that it was false. So in Jorden
v. Money, 5 House of Lords Cases 212, it was held not to be necessary
that the party making the representations should know that they were
false; that no fraud need have been intended at the time; but if the
party unwittingly mislead another, you must add that he has misled
him under such circumstances that he had reasonable ground for supposing that the person whom he was misleading would act upon what
he was saying.
In Gregg v. Wells, 10 A. & E. 90, Lord DENMAN says: ._Pickardv.
Sears was in my mind at the time of the trial, and the principle of that
case may be stated even more broadly than it is there laid down. A
party who negligently or culpably stands by and allows another to contract on the faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict,
cannot afterwards dispute that fact in the action against the person
whom he has himself assisted in deceiving." This shows that Lord
DE.INAN did not himself understand that his remarks in Pickardv.
Sears were to be taken as a definition and limitation of the equitable
doctrine, for he says the principle of the case might be stated more
broadly than it is laid down there, and may include the case of a culpable negligence. So Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vernon 136, Hunsden v. Cihey.
ney, 2 Id. 150, Teasdale v. Teasdale, 13 Viner 539, Burrowes v. Lock,
10 Yes. 475, before cited, show that the practice in equity does not require that there should in all cases be an intention to deceive, or even a
knowledge that the representation was false.
We come now to the decisions in this country, which give a broader
application to this doctrine than those before cited.
In Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill 221, the general doctrine is said to be that
when a party, either by his declarations or his conduct, has influenced
a third person to act in a particular manner, he will not be afterwards
permitted to deny the truth of the admission if the consequence would
be to work an injury to such third person, and that in such case it must
appear, first that he made an admission which is clearly inconsistent
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with the evidence he proposes to give, or tile
claim which he proposes
to set up; second, that the party has acted on the admission; third, that
he will be injured by allowing the truth of the admission to be disputed.
According to this interpretation of the equitable doctrine, it would seem
not to be necessary that the representation should be intended to deceive,
or that the party making it should know it to be false, or that it should
be intended the party should act on it, who does so in fact, and is deceived by it. The rule of this case has been adopted and followed in
.Yewman v. Hook, 37 IIiss. 207 ; Carpenter v. Stillwell, 12 Barb. 135,
and Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Penn. St. 316.
In Roe v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 138, the general doctrine is stated to be,
that. where one person by his words or conduct causes another to believe
in a certain state of things, and thus induces him to act on that belief
so as injuriously to affect his previous position, he is concluded from.
averring a different state of things as existing at the time; and this
rule was followed in the later cases of Cowles v. Bacon, 21 Conn. 451,
and Dyer v. Cady, 20 Id. 563 ; and in Preston v. Mann, 25 Id. 118,
it is said that the doctrine did not then rest on any determinate legal
test which will embrace all transactions to whieh the general principles
of equity, in which it originated, demand that it should be applied.
Buchananv. Moore, 13 S. & I. 304, 806, is to the point that though
the party believed his representation to be true, and made it under a
mistake, he is estopped to show that he made the representation innocently believing it to be true, provided the other party'acted on it, and
had reason to act on it, as true. So in Strong v. .Ellsworth, 26 Vt. 366,
it is said by REDUIELD, C. J., that he who by his words or actions, or
his silence even, intentionally or carelessly induces another to do an act
which he would not otherwise have done, and which will prove injurious
to him if he is not allowed to insist on the fulfilment, may insist on such
fulfilnut, and that the doctrine of equitable estoppels lies at the founda.
tion of morals. In Mitchell v. Reed, 9 Cal. 204, it was held that where
a statement made to a third person is not confidential, but general, and
is acted on by others, the party making the declaration is estopped to
deny its truth ; that the intention with which the declaration is made is
not material, except,. perhaps, where it is confidential. This case, and
Quirk v. Tiomas, 6 lich. 76, are authorities that to work the estoppel it
is not neces-ary the declaration should be made to the party who acts on
it, nor in his presence, nor that the declaration should be intended to
come to the knowledge of any particular person.
In a suit at law to recover damages for a false affirmation that the
signer of a note was of age, it was decided, in Lobdell v. Buker, 1 Met.
133, that it was not necessary to allege or prove that the delndant
1new the signer was an infant. WILDE, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court, said : A party may render himself liable in an action for
damages to a party prejudiced by a false affirmation, though not made
with any fraudulent intention." This, it may be said, is not directly in
poit, but the only difference is in the tbrmi of the remedy. The principle involved is the ,alic. whetlher the question is raised ina suit to
recover daimages for the ilse representation, or redress is sought by
estopping the party to prove the 11.-clchud of the representation. Both
cases go on the same general ground, that the party is responsible for
the consequences of his false representation.
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There are numerous authorities that it is not necessary to the estoppel
that the declarations or conduct should be intended to deceive any
particular person or persons; that if they were intended to deceivt
generally, or were of such a character and made in such circumstances
that it must have been understood they were likely to deceive, and any
person using due diligence was in fact deceived by them, it is enough:
Gregg v. Wells, 10 A. & E. 90; Wendell v. 'Fan Rensselaer, 1 Johns.
Oh. 353; Adams CountA v. Brown, 16 Ohio St. 78 ; Dezell v. Odell, 3
Hill 221; Quirk v. Thomas, 6 Mich. 76; Mitchell v. Reed, 9 Cal. 204.
It has been declared in many cases that this equitable estoppel involves a question of legal ethics, and applies wherever a party has made
a representation, by words or conduct, which he cannot in equity and
good conscience prove to be false; and that this kind of estoppel, being
a broad doctrine of equity, cannot be limited in application by the
terms of any narrow legal definition. In the Canal Co. v. Hathaway,
8 Wend. 483, it is said by SUTHERLAND, J., that the party is estopped
when in good conscience and equity he ought not to be permitted to
gainsay his admission; and in the same case, by NELSON, J., "from
the means in which the party must avail himself of these estoppels, it
is obvious there can be no fixed and settled rules of universal application." And in Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill 325, BRONSON, J., adopting the
language of NELSON, J., in the Canal Co. v. Hathaway, adds: "It is
a question of ethics." In Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vt., REDFIELD, J.,
says the doctrine lies at the foundation of morals. In Lucas v. Hart,
5 Iowa 415, the court hold that "in these estoppels there can be no
fixed and settled rules of convenient application to regulate them as in
technical legal estoppels; that in many, and probably in most instances,
whether the act or admission shall operate as an estoppel or not must
depend on the circumstances of the case, though there are some general
rules which may materially assist in the examination of such cases."
In the application of these general rules to that case, the court decided
that the acts and admissions of the respondent estopped him from
asserting his title to the property in question ; that to permit him to do
it would be "unconscionable, and contrary to that fairness and honest
dealing which courts of equity seek ever to promote and encourage."
In Frost v. The Saratoga Co., 5 Denio 154, it is said by BEARDSLEY,
C. J., that such an estoppel is a question of ethics, and is allowed to
prevent fraud and injustice, and exists wherever a party cannot in good
conscience gainsay his own acts or assertions. Preston v. Mann, 25
Conn. 118, is strong to the point that this estoppel, depending on a broad
doctrine of equity, cannot be governed in application by narrow and
strict rules of construction, such as have prevailed in legal estoppels.
In some if not most of the cases, in which it is said that if a party
makes representations intending to deceive the party that acts on them,
the equitable estoppel applies, it was not intended, as I think, to lay
down a rule excluding all cases that did nt fall within the statement
made in reference to the facts of the case then under consideration
that what is said is not to be taken as a rule to limit and define the
doctrine and exclude all other cases. They say, if such and such things
concur, this case will fall within the doctrine; but they do not intend to
say no other cases are within it. For example, in Kinney v. Farsworth,
1i Conn. 361, STOaRS, J., says that " admissions which have been the
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means, designedly, of leading others to a particular course of conducts
cannot afterwards be conscientiously retracted by one who has made
them."
le could not have intended to lay down the rule that one
would in no case be estopped by a representation not designed to deceive,
because the same judge, in Preston v. Man#, says: "The doctrine is
not reduced to the limits of any formula," and "whatever the motive
may be, if one so acts or speaks that the natural consequence of his
words or conduct will be to influence another to change his condition,
he is legally charged with the intent to induce the other to believe and
to act on that belief, if such proves to be the result."
In this state we have several cases where the general question has
been more or less considered. In Wells v. Pearce, 27 N. H. 503, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel was traced to its origin in equity, and it
was held that if the owner actively encourages the purchase of his
property from another, he will be precluded from claiming it, though he
was not aware of his interest at the time; which is clearly in conflict
with the notion that the representation must be accompanied with an
intention to deceive. In Davis v. fTandy, 37 N. II. 65, the doctrine of
Wells v. Pearce was approved and applied. In the recent case of Drew
v. Kimball, 43 N. 11. 285, one point directly involved was, whether it
was necessary that the party to be estopped should intend to deceive
and defraud the individual to whom the representation was made, and
who set up the defence; and it was held that it was not necessary.
Indeed, it seems to me that it would be trifling with a doctrine depending on equity and good conscience to hold otherwise. So if a representation was intended to deceive one man, and it in fact deceived and
defrauded another. Then, again, if the representation were intended
to have one operation, and, as it turned out, deceived and defrauded by
another method not contemplated by the party at the time, but still the
natural consequence of the representation, it would be quibbling with a
doctrine depending for its application on the morality of the act to hold
that the party would not be answerable for the consequences of his false
and fraudulent representation as much as if it had taken effect onithe
party and in the manner intended. In a case depending on a question
of "legal ethics," it would bring down the morality of the law to a very
low standard to hold that a party was not liable for the wrong caused by
his fraud to one nain, because the fraud was contrived against another.
In Drew v. Kimball the case did not raise the precise point taken in
this case. But, on a full discussion of the general doctrine and a review
of the authorities, the court. adopting the hypothetical case put by
PAILFE, B., in .FlTeman v. Cooke, say: " If. whatever a man's intentions may be. le so conducts himnself that a reasonable man would take
the representation to be true, and believe it was meant he should act
upon it. and lie did act upon it as true, the party making the rellresentation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth. In sh,,rt,
the representations are to be regarded as wi'il when the personi making
then means theni to be acted on, or if, without regard to intention, ho
so t inducts hii.-elf that a reaniable man would take the representation
to he trite, and believe it was meant he should act on it."
There have been several other cases in this state where this equitable
doctrine has been conilred and applied : Tompsi,n V.
II
N. I. 201 ; Simons v. S/e'l. 36 Id. 7") ; MfcjlI.,h,, v. Port.,moeth It.

